This paper re-considers some of the evidence for low and declining social mobility in Britain, showing that one study based on a re-analysis of cohort figures appears to have had an impact on policy-makers out of all proportion to its scale and rigour. The study claimed to show that the income of parents and children were more closely related for sons born in 1970 than in 1958, and that therefore social mobility was declining. It also claimed to show that the incomes of fathers and sons were more closely related in Britain than in countries such as Norway. However, a reconsideration of the same results in this paper leads to very different conclusions.
Since at least the mid-1990s, education research in the UK has been criticised for its too general lack of relevance and quality (Gorard et al. 2004) , and many initiatives have been launched that include better linkage between research and policy/practice as their aim (such as the establishment of research centres, evidence portals, systematic reviews, and the Teaching and Learning Research Programme). These initiatives face a difficult task because, of course, researchers and the research community cannot completely control the extent to which their findings are read or acted upon. The frustration expressed by Halpern (2005) , on encountering the selective and uncritical way in which policy-makers treat evidence, will be familiar to many researchers and the study discussed in detail in this paper provides another example of such difficulties. One lever that is more fully under the control of the researcher is the quality of the research and its reporting. An over-riding problem with initiatives to improve research impact is that whereas quality research without impact still has the potential to be useful, research impact without research quality is worse than useless. In this paper, I illustrate this point through consideration of a case study of recent research with, apparently, very high impact (at least in the sense of claims of influence reported by powerful commentators).
A study of intergenerational mobility
In a recent speech while she was Secretary of State for Education and Skills, Kelly (2006) claimed that 'Social mobility in the UK has declined, and remains low by international standards ' (p.5) . This is a direct and attributed reference to the study discussed in detail in this paper. Her successor, Alan Johnson, claimed to put social mobility at the heart of his personal agenda (http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article1578723.ece). As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown repeated the same claim about social mobility in Britain, and suggested that overcoming this issue will be a key to his political endeavours (http://society.guardian.co.uk/socialexclusion/story/0,,1256901,00.html). Given that, at time of writing, Brown is now Prime Minister of the UK, this issue takes on an added importance. These politicians are all basing their shocking claim on, and making direct reference to, the findings of a highly influential study conducted in
England by a team funded by the DCFS and the Sutton Trust (Blanden, Gregg and Machin 2005) .
The explanation for this decline in social mobility, according to Sir Peter Lampl, chairman of the Sutton Trust educational charity which sponsored the research, lies in the declining standards of education available to the less well-off. In the past, grammar schools offered such people an opportunity for self-improvement. 'The comprehensive system,' he says, 'was brought in to try to improve social mobility, but the opposite has happened' (http://www.suttontrust.com/press068.asp). The research finding has influenced a UNICEF report, is explicitly channelled by the Institute for Public Policy Research, the Social Market Foundation and other think tanks, and is now accepted as fact by many social and media commentators. As a piece of research it could hardly have had more widespread acceptance among the influential and their influencers.
The Blanden et al. (2005) study purports to show that intergenerational social mobility in Britain is low by international standards, and getting lower over time.
Thus, despite considerable state expenditure on education and welfare, the children of poor families tend to be poor and the children of rich families tend to be rich. (Bynner et al. 2000, p.31) . This left 13,394
cases, and this number will decline with every data sweep. The dropout in NCDS1958 4 is similar. Unfortunately, the cases dropping out at each 'sweep' are not random.
Presumably, the sickliest children are more likely to have died, and so on. This selective drop-out introduces a substantial bias for any subsequent analysis, and because it is not random it cannot be compensated for through statistical adjustment.
The potential for bias can only be highlighted, and then taken into account by analysts and their users when judging the safety of the results. The figures are also, necessarily, dated, and so any claims about social mobility based on them are not really about Britain as it is now but as it was in previous decades. This is something that David Cameron, the leader of the UK opposition at time of writing, apparently misunderstood when also citing this research for Channel 4 news (http://www.channel4.com/news/special-reports/special-reportsstorypage.jsp?id=4304&parasStartAt=1).
Blanden et al. (2005) used evidence from both of these cohort studies to make their influential claim that social mobility was decreasing over time in Britain. They examined the adjusted correlations between the income of the children and their parents in each cohort. Thus, strictly speaking, they did not consider social mobility.
Their results apply to income mobility -the extent to which the income of the child depends on the income of the parent. This is an important consideration, but not the 'social mobility' that the users of this research talk about (see above). A child who became a university lecturer, born to a father who worked as a fireman and earned as much in real terms as a lecturer, might be an example of social mobility based on education. But this would not show up as income mobility. I wonder whether Gordon
Brown and others who cite this research are aware of this limitation?
According to Blanden et al. (2005) there is a stronger, partial, correlation between the incomes of parents and children for BCS1970 (+0.28) than for NCDS1958 (+0.17).
This is the basis for their claim about declining social (income) mobility. However, two snapshots involving two unrelated groups of children, selected for participation using different techniques by different researchers, are not really the ideal basis for a claim about a trend over time. All we can really say is that the income relationship for the children remaining in the 1970 cohort is stronger than for the children remaining in the 1958 one. Is the adjusted difference between 0.28 and 0.17 large enough for us to make this claim given that over 3,000 cases would be missing from each analysis through dropout?
Neither of the figures 0.28 or 0.17 is large. We need to square them to estimate the variance in income common to both the parent and child. So, for the 1970 cohort less than 8% (or 28% of 28%) of the variation in income of the children is attributable to the parents, and for the 1958 cohort, less than 3% of the variance is attributable to the parents. Or, expressed the other way around, for the 1958 cohort 97% of the variance in children's earnings is unrelated to their parents' earnings, and for the 1970 cohort 92% of the variance is unrelated. Given the inevitable sampling variation in the initial cohorts, the dropout, the differences introduced by having panels of researchers conducting the interviews, and the errors in recalling, measuring and transcribing the figures for income, we may be forgiven for not wishing to base policy on such a small difference. In fact, perhaps the strongest conclusion and the most remarkable observation (not made by the researchers themselves) is how little variation in income is retained across generations of the same family (also see below). It is interesting to observe in Blanden et al. (2002) that their estimate of intergenerational elasticity for BCS1970 is 0.273. They describe this figure as the result for time averaged parental income -averaged when the cohort member is aged 10 and again aged 16 (see their Table 19 ). For NCDS1958 they do not time average the result. If they had used the same approach of not time averaging the BCS figures, then their result for either aged 10 or aged 16 would have been the lower figure of 0.210. This would have been much closer to the figure they do quote for NCDS and 7 which they use to claim a drop in social mobility over time. As a further example of the differences in analytical treatment of the different cohorts, Blanden et al. (2002) explain that, while it would be preferable to have the same income measures for both cohorts in order to make claims about changes over time, this is not possible. They say 'The NCDS parental income data comes from separate measures of father's earnings, mother's earnings and other income… However, the BCS only has data on parents' combined income' (p.7). In Blanden et al. (2005) , though, this problem is not discussed. We, therefore, need to ask whether their conclusion is safe. Is the size of the difference between the two cohorts large enough to overcome any reservations about bias caused by the non-random whittling away of cases and the differences between the income measures necessarily used in the two calculations?
The authors quote statistical significance as though this can help answer the question.
However, the probabilities of statistics are calculated on the basis of a random selection, and so are not appropriate here when 2,000 cases in each cohort have been systematically selected from 16,000 (Gorard 2006a) . Quoting standard errors is also inappropriate, since this not a random sample, and quoting standard errors to three decimal places (as the authors do) given that most of the original cohorts are not used in the analysis is rhetorically misleading, by suggesting that the results are accurate to the nearest five parts in ten thousand. The proportion of unexplained missing cases far outweighs the apparent difference between the two cohorts. Given that both cohort studies sampled differently in the first place, asked different questions in different orders, and had the usual levels of measurement error, it would be unwise to base policy on there being a genuine underlying difference. Therefore, the purported explanations of the difference, such as the dangers of closing grammar schools or increasing access to HE, are not needed.
Doubts about international comparators
So, how robust is the second claim, that social mobility is worse than in comparable countries? Using the same kind of data as above, Blanden et al. (2005) Table 2 (p.6) of their paper, which is reproduced here as Table 1 . All of the caveats about missing data and dropout discussed so far still apply to these figures of course, and should have the same effect of making readers wary of rushing to easy conclusions based on apparent differences between the scores for each country. 1996+1999 Father 1975 .143 Finland 1958 -1960 Average 1995+2000 Father 1975 In some countries, the income used by Blanden et al. (2005) for the parents is the father's income (as in the discussion of changes in mobility over time, see above). But for other countries, the average of the income for both mother and father is used where this is available. This reduces the comparability between countries, and it is notable that the inter-generational correlation (final column) seems to be lower on average in countries using father's income (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) than countries using average parental income (Britain, US, and West Germany). There are also large differences in the ages when the incomes of parents and children were measured in each country. This, again, reduces comparability between the figures.
The (higher) correlation for Britain is for sons' income when aged 30, either 14 or 20 years after the parents' income was measured. In Norway, the sons were measured at age 34 or 41, and so were an average of eight years older than their British counterparts, after a gap of 18 to 25 years since the parents' measurement (five years longer than their British counterparts). In Denmark the gap was 18 to 20 years for sons aged 38 to 42 at the time. In Sweden the gap was 21 to 24 years for sons aged 34
to 37, and for Finland the gap between generations was 20 to 25 years for sons aged 35 to 42. These differences in age alone would destroy the claim to differential mobility if, as is possible, the incomes of parents and sons tend to differ more the further apart the readings are taken. The differences in Table 1 might be explained as follows: in general, the greater the gap in years between generation measurements and the older the son, the lower the correlation is. They might have nothing to do with the societies in which these figures were collected.
There are other anomalies in Table 1 Norway. It is as simple as that.
In a paper subsequent to my putting these points to the authors, Blanden et al. (2006) still claim to have found a drop in income mobility 1958 to 1970, but they no longer use their own analysis to claim that mobility in Britain is low compared with international comparators. In effect, their conclusions remain the same but they have now removed the data in Table 1 
Conclusion
If the foregoing critique is accepted (even in part) it seems that the supposed explanations for poor and declining social mobility in Britain are not needed. At that time, the age participation rate for social classes I, II and IIIN was just over 30%, and the age participation rate for social classes IIIM, IV and V was around 6% (Gorard et al. 2007 ). The 1970 cohort, on the other hand, would have attended university, if they did, around 1989. At this stage, the age participation rate for social classes I, II and IIIN was still only about 36%, and for social classes IIIM, IV and V it was about 9%. These changes over time are too small, and proportionately too much in favour of the less privileged classes, to show up as a subsequent reduction in income mobility. It was in the early to mid-1990s that the number of university places expanded dramatically with the overall participation of both groups combined reaching more than 40%. This was mostly too late for the 1970 cohort, and anyway the growth in HE participation continued to be greater for the less privileged class groups anyway.
Although this is not the point made by the authors, one of the most notable features of the transmission matrices produced by Blanden et al. (2005) from both NCDS1958
and BCS1970 is actually the high level of social mobility in the UK for both cohorts.
For example, in both cohorts around 17% of those born to the poorest 25% of families end up in the richest quadrant, and vice versa. If there were no financial inheritance, no inheritance of talent, no nepotism, and perfect social mobility then the maximum this figure could be is 25%. The difference from the ideal of perfect mobility in these tables containing 2,000 cases is represented by only about 25 cases in each of the 'wrong' extreme cells. Taken at face value, a key policy message could be that Britain has a quite staggering level of social mobility. If we truly value this then we should be wary of doing anything on the basis of poor evidence that might endanger it.
Unfortunately, the unfounded claims by Blanden et al. (2005) that social mobility in
Britain is poor and worsening over time have passed into being as social facts. Bad news such as this often seems more exciting for the media and more palatable for commentators and politicians than the truth that change over time is usually less dramatic, less influenced by policy, and more beneficial, than they want to believe (Gorard 2006b ). The case study discussed in detail in this paper, chosen because of its profile, is not unique. It illustrates graphically the point that quality and impact are not always related and that, of the two, research quality is more important than impact.
High quality research with no impact remains secure as knowledge and might be used in the future. Poor quality research is useless because it leads to insecure knowledge.
Poor quality research with high visibility or impact is worse than useless. It could endanger the very thing it was intended to improve.
